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ABSTRACT: In her paper “Crossing Boundaries”, Judith Becker raises and discusses 
important points about where various boundaries between different ways of studying music 
might lie, how we negotiate those boundaries, and some of the frustrations that ensue in 
trying to get boundary-crossing work published. This response considers the increasingly 
heterogeneous nature of musicology itself; some possible overlaps, discontinuities and 
confusions between the terms ‘psychological’, ‘empirical’ and ‘scientific’; and the different 
institutional expectations and reviewing styles that often apply to work in the humanities 
and the sciences. There is no doubt that these differences can cause problems, conflicts, and 
misunderstandings; but my response ends by recognising the vigorous health of current 
interdisciplinary research in music, and the opportunities for carrying out and disseminating 
‘boundary-crossing’ research that now present themselves, of which this journal – 
Empirical Musicology Review – is one. 
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IT has become a bit of a truism that the study and practice of music has become increasingly heterogeneous – 
but in my response to Judith Becker’s interesting and provocative “Crossing Boundaries: An Introductory 
Essay” I am going to start with that truism anyway. Taking note of cultural specificity in this respect, the 
term musicology in the UK embraces a wide variety of different perspectives – getting close, perhaps, to 
what the etymology of the term implies: ‘words about music’. The first three sentences of the Grove entry for 
musicology read simply: “The term ‘musicology’ has been defined in many different ways. As a method, it is 
a form of scholarship characterized by the procedures of research. A simple definition in these terms would 
be ‘the scholarly study of music’.” (Duckles et al., 2009) And the Oxford English Dictionary entry for 
Musicology starts: “The branch of knowledge that deals with music as a subject of study rather than as a skill 
or performing art; academic research in or scholarly study of music. More generally: writing about music…” 
(OED). The purpose of the most recent research assessment exercise in the UK (RAE2008) was to assess 
research activity across all subjects in UK Higher Education. The opening statement on the research of music 
recognized “the rich diversity of research in music”, and welcomed “all outputs arising from this research, in 
whatever genre or medium”. It went on to declare that alongside composition, performance, new technology 
and music, and pedagogic research on music, it would recognize: 
 
“• musicology (including historical, critical, empirical, ethnographic, theoretical, analytical and organological 
approaches)  
• scientific approaches to the study of music  
• musical acoustics and audio engineering” (RAE 01/2006 (O)) 
 
Despite the broad definition of musicology, which includes empirical and ethnographic approaches, 
‘scientific’ approaches are nonetheless identified separately – and, weirdly, musical acoustics as separate 
from that! The apparent overlaps or redundancies between the bullet-points may be as much the reflection of 
an anxiety not to appear to exclude anything legitimate as a real confusion about what counts as ‘scientific’, 
and whether those elements are already within the broad sense of musicology. It is interesting, in the context 
of Judith Becker’s concerns in this issue of Empirical Musicology Review, that neither ethnomusicology nor 
the psychology of music are specifically mentioned at all – presumably being subsumed within either 
‘musicology’ or ‘scientific approaches’. 
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 There is a limit to the value of dictionary definitions and panel declarations, since in the end what 
matters is how the institutions and individuals behave in practice. However, these various markers from the 
UK context do serve to indicate uncertainties about where the ‘boundaries’ lie, the crossing of which is 
Judith Becker’s concern, if they are even there at all. Does the word ‘empirical’ necessarily imply 
‘scientific’, for example? As David Huron pointed out 10 years ago in the third of his Ernest Bloch lectures 
(Huron, 1999), not at all: science is only one of a number of empirical approaches to knowledge, and quite a 
lot of standard humanities-based musicological methods are empirical (i.e. observation-based) in fairly 
obvious ways (looking at scores, listening to recordings, consulting treatises). Ethnomusicologists, of course, 
have been using empirical methods for decades, but as Becker’s introductory essay makes clear, do not 
regard themselves as ‘scientists’ – and indeed may feel alienated from a scientific outlook. 
 A further complication is the relationship between science, empiricism and psychology – 
specifically the psychology of music. It is all too easy for empirical musicology to become more or less 
synonymous with the psychology of music, and there is an element of this in Becker’s introductory essay. 
The opening statement of the essay, referring back to the first issue of Empirical Musicology Review, has 
historical musicology and music theory on one side of a boundary, with the psychology of music on the 
other, implying that the psychology of music is the primary (or sole?) representative of an empirical and 
scientific approach. But that is not really the case in a number respects: first, not all psychology is empirical; 
second, arguably not all psychology is scientific; and third, the psychology of music is certainly not the only 
kind of empirical work in music. Becker is quite right to point out that other kinds of empirical approach 
were hardly represented in the first issue of Empirical Musicology Review, to which she refers at the start of 
her essay, but it would be unfortunate to allow the contents of that issue to define the field. 
So, to bring this brief discussion of definitions and boundaries to a halt, I would argue: first, that 
there is a much more fluid relationship between scientific and humanities approaches implicit within the 
broad fields of musicology, ethnomusicology and the psychology of music than is sometimes suggested; 
second, that empirical musicology represents much more than the psychology of music, and that the 
psychology of music is not necessarily empirical.  
Before I comment on Becker’s case study and associated concerns, I will make some remarks about 
the intellectual as well as institutional basis for the kinds of response with which empirical approaches are 
sometimes met. For the last five years I have been a member of the UK Arts and Humanities Research 
Council funded Centre for the History and Analysis of Recorded Music (CHARM), and will be a member of 
the successor Centre for Musical Performance as Creative Practice (CMPCP) for the next five years. In 
CHARM (and this will be the case also for CMPCP) a group of researchers in a number of institutions, but in 
every case based in a music department, have carried out a wide-ranging research program on various aspects 
of the history and analysis of recorded music. Many of those projects, but not all, have used empirical 
methods; sometimes involving experiments with human participants, in other cases involving the collection 
of large bodies of quantitative performance data gathered from historical recordings. The results of this 
research have been met with both interest and enthusiasm and suspicion and hostility. Some of this comes 
from a genuine concern by humanities scholars that complex questions, embedded in historically and 
culturally rich circumstances, will necessarily be treated in a simplistic and reductionist manner if empirical 
methods are used. There is undoubtedly that risk, and there are, I am sure, examples of empirical 
investigation in the work of CHARM and elsewhere which could have addressed matters in more 
sophisticated or nuanced ways. But another factor is a kind of intellectual impatience: it often takes a 
significant amount of time to develop the empirical tools needed to tackle an issue systematically and 
sensitively, and ‘early’ results, in which the tools are being developed and tried out, may seem preliminary 
and obvious. The audience for this research needs to have the understanding to look ahead to what might be 
accomplished a little way down the road, and to be aware that different components of this kind of research 
cannot always be reported all together. The results of an apparently ‘hard-nosed empirical approach in no 
way preclude a whole variety of complementary historical, analytical, and critical perspectives; in fact, quite 
the opposite. Where there is lack of understanding, furthermore, it is often significantly fuelled by resentment 
of the institutional kudos and financial support that empirical research is (sometimes) able to attract. 
Empirical research can involve the kind of equipment and employment of research assistants that brings in 
more conspicuous sums of money than conventional humanities scholarships. The consequent institutional 
‘grandstanding’ of this research understandably generates resentment amongst other researchers who may be 
doing work that is just as valuable but which doesn’t hit the funding headlines. In the context of a squeeze on 
arts and humanities funding (certainly in the UK), and an increasingly science-based model of research in 
general, this can be divisive amongst the various elements of music’s otherwise vigorous interdisciplinarity. 
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 The specific case of Judith Becker and Joshua Penman’s paper, and the concerns that are raised by 
their attempts to get it published in Psychology of Music, seems to turn around frustrations over the review 
process for the journal and a feeling that these arose from irreconcilable outlooks. Having been on the 
editorial or advisory boards for both more ‘humanities’ and more ‘scientific’ journals (h-journals and s-
journals from hereon), it is my experience that there are different styles (and perhaps expectations) in the 
review process. Some s-journals, for example, publicize and take pride in their fierce selectivity (which may 
approach a 95% rejection rate) in a manner that can be very off-putting to interdisciplinary scholars who 
want to publish their research in such outlets. And repeated requests for revision (third or even fourth 
requests for change before a paper will be accepted for publication) are not uncommon. The style of reviewer 
feedback may also differ significantly. In an s-journal it is quite standard to receive certainly two and often 
three separate reviews, together with the overall summary comments of an action editor or associate editor, 
who will not necessarily adjudicate between different (perhaps contradictory) comments and 
recommendations by the individual reviewers. Instead, it is usually left (in part) to the authors to disentangle, 
decided about, and then explain or defend in a covering letter that accompanies the revision. And the reviews 
themselves may be four or five pages long with detailed, line-by-line comments, specific requests for further 
information, additional analyses, or questions about particular methods and procedures. In many ways this is 
an extremely helpful and supportive review process, though it can be pretty challenging, and can at times 
seem frustrating: responding to what authors regard as a simple misunderstanding, or even misreading, of 
their work can certainly raise the blood pressure. My experience of the review process for h-journals (which 
is more limited) is that the style is less ‘bare-knuckled’: in some cases the journal editor synthesises and 
combines the separate comments of two reviewers into a single commentary, and it is rather less common for 
there to be several rounds of reviewing and revision. There is a sense that at the first round of peer review, a 
decision is basically made either to publish or not, and the function of the reviewer feedback is then to make 
suggestions for improvement, development or clarification. As a consequence, there is less likely to be a 
sense of confrontation. 
One particular problem with multiple-round reviewing, which Judith Becker alludes to, is the 
possibility that different problems, and requests for revision, are made at each stage. It is my understanding 
that most journal editorial policies try to prevent, or at least minimise, the likelihood of this happening (it is 
obviously very frustrating for an author to find that what seemed fine at round one is suddenly a problem at 
round two or three) by making sure that the same reviewers are used throughout the process, and that they do 
not suddenly raise new objections that could have been mentioned earlier. But there are perfectly benign 
reasons why it can happen: a new reviewer may be brought in if someone becomes unavailable, or the effect 
of one revision process may be to expose a problem or concern that was not apparent at the earlier stage.  
Taking what Becker identifies as three categories of ‘unaddressable critique’, I think psychologists 
are open to the idea that emotional responses to music are due to more than just the ‘specific structural 
aspects of the music’ (category one), and equally, that various physiological measures are admissible as 
components of emotional responses to music. There is published work in s-journals (some of it referred to in 
Penman and Becker’s paper) that demonstrates just those ideas. In both cases, it seems to me, the critical 
factor is how the case is made, in terms of both the strength of the empirical evidence and how 
‘accommodating’ the model is that is presented. The third ‘elephant in the room’ factor (that reviewers are 
fundamentally suspicious of any investigation of religious ecstatics) is a worrying one. It would obviously be 
quite wrong to prevent publication of research simply on the basis of the category of ‘human being’ that it 
involved (as long as ethical considerations were properly met – as they seem to have been in this case), but I 
am not convinced of the evidence for this claim by Becker. I do not think that it is true that “if there is a 
taboo subject among psychologists and scientists in general, it is altered states”. The quoted comment from 
one reviewer that “the problems of getting a genuine and solid experimental handle on the study of religious 
trance seem formidable” seems true to me; though of course not a reason to resist publication in that area, but 
rather the reverse. In short, I do not feel that these three categories of critique are unaddressable; though I 
agree that they are challenging. 
Having read the two (s- and h-) versions of the paper, which differ only in minor respects (it would 
be interesting to know how an ethnomusicology journal would react, or has reacted, to the humanities 
version), I have come to my own view of the generous-spirited reflective remarks that Becker makes about 
the whole experience towards the end of her introductory essay. As a journal, Psychology of Music has, in my 
experience, adopted a very accommodating approach to the kinds of research that it will consider for 
publication, including plenty of non-statistical, even non-empirical, work. The phenomenology of individual 
musicians/listeners (mentioned as a commitment that ethnomusicology should not give up) is certainly not 
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precluded in psychology of music research. Indeed, case study and other qualitative approaches have become 
increasingly accepted over the last 15 years. And while I certainly agree that ethnomusicology should not 
“give up its exploration of large issues that are resistant to empirical verification”, neither should the 
psychology of music; there is plenty of work that does just that (theoretical, speculative, exploratory 
research). 
To conclude, without (I hope) just seeming blandly or uncritically positive, my own view is that 
there are more opportunities for interdisciplinary work to find an outlet than there have ever been. There are 
more journals with interdisciplinary policies, and book publishers who are prepared to consider 
interdisciplinary proposals, as well as conferences and research centres with explicitly interdisciplinary aims. 
That does not eliminate the possibility of encountering the kind of frustrating experience that Judith Becker 
describes in her introductory essay. Indeed, it is important to be reminded of the different perspectives and 
expectations that may be involved, as well as the contribution made by institutional pressures tied up with 
funding and prestige (often very unequally distributed between the sciences and humanities) that I have 
mentioned in this commentary. But I think there are many reasons to feel extremely positive about the health 
of interdisciplinary research in general, and of the particular strength that it has within the study of music. In 
all kinds of ways, it seems to me that there are far fewer boundaries to cross than existed when I was a 
doctoral student 30 years ago. 
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